INTRODUCTION
The 1993 Constitution, 1 for the first time in South African history accorded constitutional recognition to international law, thereby bringing an end to the debate on the status of international law in South African domestic law. This step was a symbolic break from the apartheid legal system, which was closely associated with the violation of international law and indicated to the international community that South Africa was willing to abide by internationally accepted rules. More important, however, for South African lawyers are the fundamental changes the constitutional regulation of international law introduced into South African law.
The 1993 Constitution dealt with the conclusion of international agreements (sections 82(1)(i) and 231(2)), the status of international law in South African law (section 231(3) and (4)) and the role of international law in interpreting the chapter on fundamental rights (section 35(1)). These provisions were substantially taken over by the 1996 Constitution. The provisions relating to the entry into international agreements and the status thereof in terms of South African law are once again dealt with under section 231. The provisions on customary international law are dealt with separately under section 232.
Section 233 deals with the role of international law in the interpretation of legislation, whilst section 39, the equivalent of section 35 of the 1993
Constitution, provides for international law in interpreting the Bill of Rights.
Not much has yet been written as far as analysis of the above sections are concerned. Presently, the primary sources pertaining to procedural aspects are the Manual on 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AS A TOOL OF INTERPRETATION: S V MAKWANYANE AND ANOTHER
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In S v Makwanyane and Another, the Constitutional Court dealt with the constitutionality of the death penalty. The 1993 Constitution did not express itself on the matter of capital punishment. It was decided during the negotiating process neither to exclude nor to sanction the death penalty, but to leave it to the Constitutional Court to decide whether the death penalty is consistent with Chapter 3 of the Constitution. 3 The matter was brought to the Constitutional Court for decision in S v Makwanyane and Another on behalf of two accused sentenced to death on counts of murder. It was contended on behalf of the accused that the imposition of the death penalty for murder was a cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment that should be declared unconstitutional. Chaskalson P made extensive and creative use of international law in his judgment.
Chaskalson P resorted to international law in interpreting the Constitution. It was argued that documents used during the negotiating process (specifically those relating to the position of the death penalty), formed part of the context within which the Constitution should be interpreted. Chaskalson interprets the term public international law as follows:
In the context of section 35(1), public international law would include non-binding as well as binding law. They may both be used under the section as tools of interpretation. Chaskalson concluded that "capital punishment is not prohibited by international law, and this is a factor that has to be taken into account in deciding whether it is cruel, inhuman or degrading within the meaning of section 11(2)".
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Chaskalson's view that those international agreements binding on South Africa after ratification or accession in terms of article 231 provide only a framework for the interpretation of Chapter 3 under section 35, stands to be critisised. This is in contrast with the intention of the drafters that international agreements to which South Africa is a party and binding custom, should form part of the law of the land in so far as they are not in conflict with the Constitution. Surely it is necessary to differentiate on a theoretical basis between binding and non-binding international law for purposes of the interpretation of Chapter 3. Binding law is binding and non-binding is not binding but may be used for other purposes, such as an interpretative aid. It is suggested that section 35 should only refer to non-binding international law and that binding international law should be treated in terms of the provisions of section 231.
INTERPRETATION OF THE TERM INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT BY SOUTH AFRICAN COURTS: THE HARKSEN CASES
15 T Maluwa "The incorporation of international law and its interpretational role in municipal legal systems in Africa: an exploratory survey" (1998) 23 SAYIL at 59 argues to the contrary that there is no doubt that the scope of international law envisaged by Chaskalson P encompasses not only the 'hard' law of customary rules, treaty provisions and judicial decisions, but also 'soft' law contained in resolutions, declarations and guidelines drawn up by the appropriate international bodies, and also international law not binding on South Africa. Section 231 reads as follows:
1.
The negotiating and signing of all international agreements is the responsibility of the national executive. An international agreement binds the Republic only after it has been approved by resolution in both the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces, unless it is an agreement referred to in subsection An international agreement of a technical, administrative or executive nature, or an agreement which does not require either ratification or accession, entered into by the national executive, binds the Republic without approval by the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces, but must be tabled in the Assembly and the Council within a reasonable time. Any person accused or convicted of an extraditable offence committed within the jurisdiction of a foreign State which is not a party to an extradition agreement shall be liable to be surrendered to such foreign State, if the President has in writing consented to his or her being surrendered.
A series of diplomatic notes dealing with Harksen's extradition were exchanged by the German government and the South African government through the Department of Foreign Affairs. The president subsequently granted his consent to extradite Harksen on the basis of section 3(2) of the Extradition Act.
CAPE HIGH COURT APPLICATION
Harksen brought an application before the Cape High Court consisting of a constitutional application and a review application. The review application dealing with irregularities in the extradition inquiry will not be considered here.
Of importance for present purposes is the constitutional application. In addition to being used as a vehicle for the conclusion of international agreements diplomatic notes are also the bread and butter of diplomatic relations and are used on a daily basis as the standard method of diplomatic communication, Diplomatic notes would certainly make up a significant portion of what Baxter terms 'the vast sub-structure of inter-governmental paper' and if each note dealing with any matter of substance were to be considered an international agreement then it would certainly create administrative chaos … In this sense it is a great relief that the court rejected Harksen's argument.
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The judgment can be commended for the measure of judicial clarity it provides on the meaning of the term "international agreement" in section 231.
By excluding extradition under section 3(2) of the Extradition Act from the scope of section 231, the court indirectly supported the understanding that the term "international agreements" as used by section 231 applies only to legally binding agreements creating enforceable rights and duties. 33 By following this line of argument the court further recognised the separate and thriving species of informal agreements. Although they fall outside the scope of the Constitution and are not legally binding they may still bear significant legal relevance as was illustrated in the present case.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT APPLICATION
The above clearly did not accord with Harksen's understanding of matters as he proceeded to approach the Constitutional Court. Harksen maintained that presidential consent under section 3(2) constituted an international agreement, which would be invalid for non-compliance with section 231.
As in the case of the Cape High Court decision, the Constitutional Court considered the legal effect of the presidential consent under section 231. In a judgment delivered by Goldstone, the court stated that although presidential consent under section 3(2) may eventually have international resonance, the Although the judicial determination of the existence of an international agreement may require the consideration of a number of complex issues, the decisive factor is said to be whether 'the instrument is intended to create international legal rights and obligations between the parties'.
The court, however, proceeded to follow a different line of reasoning than that of the Cape High Court. The latter regarded the intention of parties to create binding rights and obligations as the test for binding international agreements, however agreements between international role players not intended to create such rights and obligations were accepted as informal agreements, falling outside the scope of the Constitution. The Constitutional Court, however, maintained that there were no agreements at all in the present case, neither formal nor informal. 37 The court held that the decision to extradite in terms of section 3(2) was never more than a domestic act, which was never transformed into an agreement by way of the exchange of diplomatic notes: 
CONCLUSION
International law, a legal system marginalized and distorted by apartheid, was restored to its rightful status as part of South African law by the 1993 and 1996 South African Constitutions. The constitutional regulation of the status of international law, however, introduced new concepts into South African law. Courts, governmental law advisers and academics are looked at to provide guidance in the interpretation of international law terminology, which have now become part of South African constitutional law. The Makwanyane and Harksen cases provide much needed guidance in this regard. In clarifying the content of the terms "public international law" in Makwanyane and "international agreement" in the Harksen cases the courts had to resort to primary sources of international law. Despite their divergent facts and legal questions, the courts in all three cases had to assess the binding nature of international law, be it as a source of international law or as legitimate species of international agreement. This requires a sound knowledge of international law. Despite the possible errors and omissions in the courts' judgments, these cases focussed the debate on the increasing relevance of international law in matters before domestic courts.
